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Alberto H. Landro




Objetivist models are based on the deterministic hypothesis that postulates the existence 
of probability, which is cognoscible only in an asymptotic manner. On the other hand, 
subjectivist models consider the aleatoristic hypothesis according to which there is no 
truth  about  probability.  However,  both  hypotheses  may  only  be  compared  through 
stochastic models, which are not strictly falsifiable. Therefore, neither the hypothesis 
stating the existence of a true value regarding the probability of occurrence of an event 




1.- An introduction to the theory of chance 
 
 
The conceptualization of chance arose associated with the idea of lack of sufficient 
information  about  the  causal  structure  that  supposedly  determines  the  behaviour  of 
factual phenomena: the observer has a piece of information-whether it is objective in 
nature or consists of the knowledge of multiple characteristics data and origins that 
constitute their personal experience (subjective) on this phenomenon-that is incomplete 
(due  to  the  sort  of  universal  solidarity  which  links  the  processes  and makes  nature 
appear as infinitely complicated) encouraging, therefore, that the reasons of a part of the 
phenomenon’s behaviour remain ignored for him. 
 
This classical Thomistic notion of chance ignorance-for a long time the only notion 
accepted by moral theology-implies a deterministic conception of the outside world to 
the observer based on certain metaphysical assumptions: i) that the world to which the 
phenomena belong is real, ii) that there are objective laws that govern their behaviour 
and iii) that these laws are inherent to the phenomena and they are also rational and 
asymptotically cognoscible. 
 
The  inadequacy  of  the  classical  method  to  explain  “…an  unstable  world  we  know 
through a finite window”
1, in which an infinitesimal change in the knowledge of the 
observer,  despite  having  deterministic  equations,  leads  to  a  realization  of  the 
phenomenon  to  any  other  of  his  infinite  set  of  possible  realizations  in  which  the 
irreversibility  is  the  rule  and  the  reversibility  is  the  exception,  gave  rise  to  a  new 
formulation-aleatorist-which  essentially  differed  with  classical  dynamics  in  the 
application of the concept of process state at a given instant as the result of an evolution 
oriented over time. 
 
As a result, it can be concluded that accepting the classical hypothesis-deterministic-is 
equivalent to assuming that every phenomenon is explicable on the assumption that-in 
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1 Prigogine, I., Nicolis, G. (1977).   2 
the limit-it is the necessary consequence of an infinite set of factors that define its causal 
structure.  On the contrary, accepting the notion of objective partial aleatorism or the 
thermodynamic  interpretation-aleatorist-involves  replacing  the  classical  concept  of 
chance-ignorance (epistemological) by the chance-absolute (ontological), replacing the 
statement "the observer can never know" by the statement “neither the observer nor 
nature can know". 
 
In either case, the presence of such a thing called chance that inevitably appears in the 
vision that every observer has about the behaviour of all phenomena, generates a feeling 
of uncertainty which formal quantitative representation is given by the probability. 
 
This  appreciation  of  the  concept  of  probability  as  inferential  logic  of  uncertain 
knowledge gives rise to a fundamental question: how can a feeling of uncertainty be 
characterized by a numerically defined probability? 
 
The  different  scenarios  that  led  to  this  question  gave  rise  to  a  notion  of  objective 
probability  based  on  the  concept  of  expectation  and,  then,  on  an  essentially  dual 
interpretation that assimilated the probability, either to a deductive expression based on 
the symmetry of the aleatorism inherent to some events-classical definition-either to 
the frequency with which certain phenomena are verified-frequentist definition. In the 
first case, the probability is determined by the possible ways to present the results of a 
phenomenon; in the second one, by the observed frequencies of such results. 
 
Just a little later, and with the aim of approaching a neo-Bayesian conception of the 
notion  of  identifying  model  of  the  probability,  a  third  logistic  interpretation  arose, 
which  assimilates  the  probability  to  an  indefinite  logical  relationship  between  a 
proposition and a knowledge body.  The item added to the logistic conceptualization of 
the  inevitable  involvement  in  the  process  of  induction  of  individual-assessor  as  a 
transforming mechanism of information, led to a more general subjective (personalist) 
definition of probability. 
 
Given the failure in the attempt to find a universal definition of the notion of probability 
through a  more  or less complex formula,  the  possibility of a return to  a somewhat 
objectivist interpretation was posed from less stringent definitions based on a variant of 
logicism, known as the propensity theory, which combines the concept of probability 
to that of the potential possibilities. 
 
In addition to obtaining an explicit theoretical definition of probability (related to an 
axiomatic system consistinf of itself), each of these interpretations insisted on obtaining 
a consequent inferential structure, defined by explicit or implicit rules of interpretation, 
which characterized its role of identifying model of the true value of that elusive and 
purely theoretical measure of uncertainty called “probability”. 
 
 
2.-The probability models and their rules of interpretation 
 
2.1.-The classical model 
 
The classic definition suffers from unavoidable failures that restrict Laplace’s dogmatic 
pretension of enshrining it as the only valid model of the true nature of probability,   3 
basically,  its  purely  deductive  nature  (which  prevents  the  definition  of  rules  of 
interpretarion),  the  underniable  circularity  and  the  impossibility  of  its  application 
outside the scope of the phenomena of ideal existence in which the physical mechanism 
that generates randomness includes, symmetrically, all possible outcomes. 
 
It is well-known treatment that the literature has been devoted to the tautology that 
encloses  the  equiprobability  assumption  of  the  possible  outcomes  and especially  its 
attempt  at  justification  from  the  (subjective)  principle  of  insufficient  reason  which, 
given  its  tendency  to  generate  paradoxes  that  prevent  the  determination  of  unique 
probability values, is not obviously valid as an argument against circularity. 
 
 
2.2.-The frequentist model 
 
 
The frequentist definition is only suitable for calculating the probability of occurrence 
of those phenomena considered repeatable.  Talking about the probability of occurrence 
of a single phenomenon or the probability for a proposition to be true or false has no 
sense in the frequentist context.  The probabilities calculated from this interpretation are 
objective and, therefore, independent of the opinion of the individual-assessor. 
 
The postulate of Quetelet, A., (1835) (1848) on the assimilation of the gravitational 
laws to the constant causes that govern society and the works of Fechner, G. Th. (1866) 
(1871) about the existence of a variant of partial indeterminism in the behaviour of 
factual phenomena led to the concept of “collective object” (Kollektivgegenstand”) or 
“collective series” (“Kollektivereihe”), defined as a heterogeneous group of individuals 
that vary randomly with respect to a common attribute (in particular, a quantifiable 
attribute). In its simplest terms, the “Kollektiv” can be considered as a sequence of 
results obtained from a series of repeated observations on equal terms, each of which 
admits only two possible alternatives.  This concept of “Kollektivgegenstand” prospered 
with the flourishing of empiricism  developed by  the  Vienna Circle in the  work  of-
among others-the philosopher and psychologist Lipps, G.F. (1898)(1901)(1905) and the 
astronomers Helm, G. (1902) and Bruns, H. (1897)(1898)(1905)(1906) and culminated 
in  the  reformulation  of  the  concept  of  probability  by  von  Mises,  R.M.E. 
(1912)(1919a)(1919b)(1928)  and  Reichenbach,  H.  (1935)  “…in  order  to  replace  or 
supplement the rigid causal structure of classical theory”
2. 
 
von Mises, R. (1928) considered the need to distinguish between “empirical collectives” 
(which consist of a finite number of elements that are observable and that give rise to 
what  some  authors  have  called  finite  frequentism)  and  “mathematical  collectives” 
(comprising  a  sequence  of  infinite  elements  that  give  rise  to  what  is  known  as 
hypothetical frequentism) and assumed that the empirical collectives comply with two 
fundamental  principles:  the  law  of  statistical  frequency  stability  and  the  law  of 
irregularity.   
 
Based  on  these  principles  and  on  the  assumption  that  infinite  sequences  are 
mathematical abstractions or idealizations of empirical reality which are necessary to 
obtain an acceptable mathematical representation of probability, von Mises established 
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the (highly debatable) postulate whereby a finite empirical collective could represent an 
infinite mathematical collective in analytical terms.  It should be noted that von Mises 
was an empiricist and that his analysis was always based on an operating philosophy by 
which the theoretical principles  must be defined in terms  of observable phenomena 
according to the characteristics of an empirical collective.  According to this operational 
interpretation, the nature of repeatable phenomena  is such that: i) it is  possible,  by 
abstraction, to obtain some mathematical concepts that allow to formulate the empirical 
laws  that  govern  their  behaviour,  ii)  using  abstraction  once  again  and  from  such 
empirical laws, it is possible to define the axioms of mathematical theory associated 
with that behaviour and iii) from this mathematical theory, it is possible to discover 
consequences that allow the explanation and prediction of other repeatable phenomena. 
 
The positivist-operationalism of von Mises’s ideas is primarily due to the influence of 
Ernstr Mach’s work (in particular, “The science of mechanics: A critical and historical 
account of its development”).  His development of the probability theory followed the 
same pattern as the development of mechanics that Mach achieved: he introduced the 
law of stability of statistical frequencies (assumed valid from observation) and he based 
his  definition  of  probability  on  such  law  (the  definition  of  a  theoretical  concept-
probability-identifiable  in  terms  of  limit  behaviour  of  an  observable  model-relative 
frequency),  but  he  provided  no  link  between  observation  and  theory  beyond  the 
controversial use of the limits of a finite sequence of observations and justification from 
the application of the concept of limit in theoretical physics. 
 
Among the many changes that von Mises’s frequentist interpretation was subjected to, 
the most important was undoubtedly the one attributed to Reichenbach, H. (1935), who 
sought to obtain a definition of probability through an axiomatic way and to justify its 
intuitive meaning.  Regarding the first question, Reichenbach tried a solution based 
exclusively  on  the  set  theory  and  on  logic  operations,  obtaining  a  (purely  formal) 
definition of probability expressed as a relationship between two kinds of propositions. 
 
Regarding  the  second  question,  Reichenbach  sought  to  broaden  the  scope  of  the 
frequentist  interpretation  to  non-repeatable  events,  by  defining  what  he  called 
“reference classes” consisting of similar events to the analysed one and he considered 
the theory of probability as the discipline that assesses unknown probabilities of derived 
collectives  from  known  probabilities  of  origin  collectives.    But  this  generalization 
encountered the insurmountable difficulty which means the impossibility of determining 
objective selection rules, universally accepted, of the events that must integrate these 
reference classes.  
 
To avoid any kind of regularity in the sequences of events which make the basis, both 
von Mises’s definition and Reichenbach’s made an attempt to provide their probability 
models with a strictly mathematical content by enforcing complicated conditions that 
inevitably restricted the concept of total chance/aleatorism and led to the conclusion that 
it was impossible to give the notion of “absolute irregularity”
3 a mathematically precise 
nature. 
 
Al these conditions led to transform the frequentist model into a purely mathematical 
theory that, instead of dealing with favourable results and possible results as in the 
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classical model, deals with limits which are abstract mathematical entities in which the 





2.3.-The logistic model 
 
 
As  an  extension  to  the  definition  of  probability  “a  posteriori”  of  the  frequentist 
interpretation, arise the proposal of the so-called logical interpretation, which led to a 
model in which the general notion of probability (which results into a degree of rational 
belief or similar idea about the occurrence of a phenomenon) is exclusively a function 
of a certain state of knowledge defined by a set of arguments, intrinsic or extrinsic to 
this phenomenon, that the observer has through the perception of a logical relationship 
among  the  propositions
4.  A  probability,  ( ) p A B / ,  conceived  as  an  (indefinite) 
relationship  between  a  proposition  ( A )  and  a  body  of  knowledge  ( B ),  between  a 
“…statement  and  another  statement  (or  set  of  statements)  that  represents  the 
evidence”
5,  conditioned  by  the  truth  of  such  evidence.    Where  the  event  A can, 
therefore, be represented by a subset  A Ì W such that    ( ) { } A w S w istrue = / , so that 
every event has a single group A   and vice versa, that is, a set  A in the space of events 
corresponds to each proposition  ( ) S w  of the propositional space and vice versa. 
 
The  logistic  interpretation  was  based  on  the  contributions  made  by  Augustus  de 
Morgan, John Venn, Harold Jeffrey, and, in particular, John Maynard Keynes, followed 
by the members of the Vienna Circle, Bernard Bolzano, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Friedrich 
Waismann, and in particular, Rudolf Carnap and Karl Popper. 
 
The starting point of Keynes’s approach was precisely to define a partial link theory as a 
generalization of the theory of total link of deductive logic and to consider probability 
as an assessment of that partial link, so that it is not possible to speak of the probability 
of a hypothesis but only of its probability conditioned by some evidence partly linked to 
it.  Then,  given  a  set  h of  propositions  and  a  conclusion  consisting  of  a  set  of 
propositions  a , if  h partly implies in  a degree  a, then, identifying the partial link 
degrees with the rational belief degrees, Keynes concluded that, given  h there will be a 
degree a of rational belief in  a , that is, a relationship of degree probability a between 
a  and  h .  Note that Keynes assimilates his probabilistic model to a degree of rational 
belief but not simply to a degree of individual belief.  That is, he considers probabilities 
as values objectively fixed by the observer which are comparable to intuitively known 
logical  relations,  but  using  a  Platonic  concept  of  the  term  “objective”,  that  is,  not 
referring to “things” of the material world, but “something” in a Platonic world made up 
of  abstract  ideas,  similar  to  that  postulated  by  the  Cambridge  philosophers,  which 
included  objective  ideas,  ethical  qualities  (with  the  idea  of  “virtue”  occupying  a 
prominent place) and mathematical entities. 
                                                
4 Ramsey, F.P. (1931): “According to this interpretation, the theory of probability is considered as a 
branch of logic, the logic of partial belief and non-conclusive argument.” 
5 . Kyburg, H.E.; Smokler, H.E. (1980).   6 
 
 
2.4. - The subjectivist model 
 
 
If we add the inability to stop considering the intervention of the individual-evaluator as 
an  information  source  or  as  an  observations  transformer  mechanism  to  this  logistic 
conceptualization  in  the  induction  process,  the  subjectivist-more  general-model  of 
Bernoullian  probability  emerges,  according  to  which  the  existence  of  probability 
assessments that do not coincide with each other even for similar states of knowledge is 
understandable given that, in this aleatorist context, the maximum objectivity to which 
one  can  aspire  is  a  kind  of  concordance  of  individual  assessments,  a  certain 
intersubjectivity.  
 
Beyond some curious previous background, it can be considered that the subjective 
theory of probability was introduced independently by Ramsey, F.P. (in Braithwaite, 
R.B.  (1931))  and  de  Finetti,  B.  (1930a)  (1930b)  (1930c)  (1931a)  (1931b)  (1937). 
Ramsey raised his proposal-strictly of an antilogicist nature-from a detailed critique of 
the  Keynesian  interpretation,  while  de  Finetti’s  work-strictly  of  an  antifrequentist 
nature-originates in the proposal of E. Czuber who, in his 1903 memoirs and in the 
second revised and expanded edition published in 1908-1910, provided one of the best 
expositions on the paradoxes of geometric probability (see Keynes, J.M. (1921)) and he 
concluded that there is no need to assume compliance with the condition of insufficient 
reason. 
 
In subjectivist terms, the probability of occurrence of an event  E could be interpreted as 
the price (bet)  p that an individual considers fair to pay an opponent for the right to 
receive a unit amount, to be payable if  E is verified.  The fairness condition implies the 
indifference between being one player or the other one, between paying or charging  p  
to collect or to pay 1 when  E  is verified.  In that case, it is said that the assessment of 
the probability is “coherent” as it does not place any of the players in the position of 
winning for certain.  That is, if  p  is a coherent evaluation in Ramsey-de Finetti’s sense 
of  the  probability  of  occurrence  of  an  event  E to  an  individual,  since  the  price  is 
understood here as a linear scale, the evaluation of the probability of not occurrence of 
E   (that  is,  the  occurrence  of  E )  for  such  individual  should  be 
( ) ( ) ( ) p E q p E p E p = = - = - = - 1 1 1 . 
 
It is worth remembering that, according to the objectivist interpretation, it is said that an 
event  E  has a probability of occurrence ( ) p E , taking an event not as a well-defined 
individual case, but as all the events of a certain type (it should be noted that, in the 
objectivist context, the probability is considered a real property of a special type of 
physical situations called events).  By contrast, the subjectivist interpretation, based on 
an aleatorist conception, considers probability always to belong to individual events 
and, whenever a probability is assigned, it is necessary to think of it as subordinate to 
each  observer’s  interpretation  of  a  set  of  particular  information  (considering  an 
individual  event  a  case  that,  for  an  individual  that  in  certain  circumstances  cannot 
certainly ensure its occurrence is random). 
   7 
 
2.5. - The propensionalist model 
 
 
The  interpretations  discussed  above  consider  that  the  notion  of  probability  is 
represented by a more or less canonical version.  While his failure to obtain a universal 
definition would seem to refute this hypothesis, this should not be considered as an 
acknowledgement of the impossibility of identifying the true value of the probability 
through a formula but, perhaps, as the need for less stringent definitions from a diffuse 
set of propositions
6.  This principle gave rise to a new objectivist model of probability 
based on the theory of propensities. 
 
This propensionalist model was introduced by Popper, K.R. (1957b), developed in his 
works in 1959b, 1983 and 1990, and continued by a group of philosophers of science 
such as D.W. Miller and J.H. Fetzer
7. 
 
The problem  that gave  rise  to this  theory  entailed deciding  about  the possibility of 
identifying “unique” objective probabilities about the occurrence of single events.  In 
principle, Popper (1934) considered a single event as von Mises’s particular element of 
a  collective  and  suggested  that  his  “single  probability”  could  be  assimilated  to  his 
probability in the collective considered as a whole but, later, in his works in 1957b and 
1959b, he deserted that frequentist interpretation. 
 
Note that the word propensity suggests a type of orderly enumeration, which makes a 
difference with the frequentist viewpoint which, as it was presented, shows that the 
probabilities can  only be introduced  in physical  situations (that is, in “occasions of 
whole  display”,  according  to  Peirce,  C.S.’s  nomenclature  (1910))  for  which  it  is 
possible  to  define  a  collective.  In  Popper’s  propensionalist  model,  it  is  absolutely 
legitimate to postulate the existence of probabilities on sets of conditions, although they 
do not support a sufficiently large number of repetitions, which implies an indisputably 
significant expansion of the set of situations in which the theory of probability applies, 
with respect to the frequentist  interpretation.  The  probabilities of individual events 
should be considered as primarily dependent on the set of conditions to which the event 
is referred more than to the event itself
8. 
 
Popper’s proposal was modified by Miller, D.W. (1994) (1996) who, in his intention to 
solve  the  foundational  problem  of  unique  probabilities’  identification,  dissociated 
propensities from repeatable conditions and proposed an association with the states of 
the universe, transforming propensionalism from a scientific theory into a metaphysical 
one. 
 
In  order to avoid the metaphysical character of the model, unlike Popper’s original 
proposal and Miller’s modification, Fetzer, J.H. (1982) (1993) abandoned the idea of 
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associating propensities to a complete state of the universe and suggested linking them 
to a complete set of relevant conditions so that, to falsify a “conjectured” value of a 
propensity, “conjectures” about a list of these relevant conditions should be presented.  
Now  well,  given  the  insurmountable  difficulties  that  the  formulation  entails  and, 
consequently, the falsifation of the required conjectures, it can be concluded that in 
Fetzer’s model the propensities also show a more metaphysical than scientific aspect 
and, therefore, his concept of probability cannot be generally extended to the singular 




3. - The criteria for falsifation of probabilistic models 
 
 
From the principles of non-existence of metaphysical assumptions about the true nature 
of  probability,  and  in  order  to  evaluate  the  explicit  explanatory  capacity  of  the 
frequentist,  subjectivist  and  propensionalist  models,  the  corresponding  criteria  of 
falsification  were  developed  as  a  means  to  contrast  the  correlation  between  a 




With  respect  to  the  frequentist  model,  it  should  be  noted  that  in  von  Mises’s 
conception,  the  properties  of  the  collectives  are  not  expressed  in  relation  to  actual 
phenomena or to effective observation procedures, but are regarded as axioms, so it is 
assumed that their consequences are deductible in a rigorous way.  Now then, those 
consequences will be true only if the axioms that originate them are true.  In particular, 
considering the convergence of the sequence of frecuencies (that is, to the transfer from 
finite ferquentism to hypothetical frequentism) as an axiom and not as an event that 
could  reasonably  be  true,  requires  recognition  of  certain  principles  of  metaphysical 
determinism regarded as unacceptable when they contradict the conditions inherent in 
the definition of the falsifation criteria.  
 
In  this  respect,  von  Mises  proposed  a  more  restrictive  criterion  of  falsification 
consisting of an extension of the postulate known as the exclusion law of the game 
systems, which requires not only the stability of relative frequencies for certain specific 
results, but the invariance of these frequencies to a selection, according to a rule, of a 
sequence located in the original sequence.  Critics to this proposal refer not only to their 
arguments  based  on  the  inaccurate  or  semi-mathematical  notion  of  game  system  or 
localized selection, but to the not fully specified notion of admissible selection.  To 
correct these shortcomings, Church, A. (1934) (1936a) (1936b), Turing, A. (1936) and 
Wald,  A.  (1937)  proposed  a  more  precise  method  of  specification  of  the  located 
selections based on the definition of computable function, obtaining precisions that can  
be considered fully valid in the ambit of classical mathematics, but not admissible in the 
ambit  of  constructivist  mathematics.    In  this  context,  according  to  the  algorithmic 
complexity  theory,  one  can  easily  conclude  that  it  is  not  possible  to  justify  the 
aleatorism of a sequence, that is, that Wald-Church-Turing’s proposal does not provide 
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known  logical  relations,  which  are  nor  always  quantifiable  and,  in  many  cases,  they  are  not  even 
comparable among them (see Landro, A.H. (2010a)).   9 
a  strict  characterization  of  the  property  of  irregularity,  of  its  relationship  with  the 
condition  of  stochastic  independence,  and  therefore,  of  the  axiom  of  statistical 
convergence  of  relative  frequency.  It  follows  that  the  condition  of  irregularity 
(“Regellosikeit”) assumes, even in this case, a purely subjective character. 
 
On the other hand, it proved to be undeniable that the probabilities interpreted as a 
relative frequency limit are always conditioned by a particular empirical collective and 
the fact that the notion of empirical series does not match that of the mathematical 
sequence (in which the law that univocally determines its elements is known) leads to 
the conclusion that the convergence of frequencies is not comparable to the analytic 
operation of passing the limit. 
 
As for the personalist probabilistic model, in accordance with the considerations in 
Section 2.4., it is easy to conclude that any falsification criterion associated with this 
interpretation caters exclusively to the falsifation of the proposition derived from the 
sense  of  personal  uncertainty  of  the  observer,  regardless  the  consideration  of  any 
reference to external phenomena. 
 
Some authors try to overcome this restriction interpreting de Finetti’s exchangeability 
condition as a link between personal and physical probabilities.  In his representation 
theorem,  de  Finetti,  B.  (1937)  shows  that  given  a  finite  sequence  of  exchangeable 
events,  { } E E En 1 2 , ,..., ,  when  n ® ¥ ,  the  distribution  function  of  the  variable 
( ) ( ) E
n
E E E n n
* = + + +
1
1 2 ... ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) F p E n n p p = £
* , converges (except at points of discontinuity) 
to a limit function  ( ) F p  and, as a corollary, establishes the link between the concepts of 
exchangeability  and  independence:    “Let  ( ) p E x   be  the  probability  attributed  to  a 
generic event  E  when events  E E E n 1 2 , ,...,  are considered independent and equally likely 
with  probability  p ,  assuming  that  events  Ei   are  exchangeable  with  limited 
distribution ( ) F x ,  the  probability  ( ) p E of  the  same  generic  event  is  given  by 
( ) ( ) ( ) p E p E dF x x =∫
0
1
.  This  property  can  be  expressed  as  follows:  the  probability 
distributions  p for  the  case  of  exchangeable  events  are  linear  combinations  of 
distributions  px  for the case of equiprobable independent events, the weighs in the 
linear combinations are expressed as ( ) F x ”. 
 
Now, with respect to the scope of use of this representation theorem, it should be noted 
that it is illusory, in this context, to suppose that a model can be built on something that 
has no empirical meaning, such as the events of infinite domain
10.  In the inference 
ambit,  the  representation  theorem  should  be  taken  in  accordance  with  its  weakest 
formulation,  whereby  the  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  events  En   to  be 
exchangeable  is  that,  conditioned  by  a  random  element p ,  the  joint  probability 
distribution for any finite sequence is the same.  Therefore, it can be concluded that, 
from a purely formal point of view, the exchangeable events are comparable to events 
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considered  independent  with  constant  but  unknown  probability  ( p ),  where  p   is 
distributed  according  to  the  mixed  distribution  that  the  representation  theorem 
postulates.   
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that: i)the existence of (objective) probability  p  is a 
purely  mathematical  condition  due  to  some  particular  extension  of  a  consistent 
distributions family of a finite dimension to a law for the sequence  { } E E En 1 2 , ,..., ,... ; ii) 
according  to  Regazzini,  E.;  Petris,  G.  (1992),  there  are  sequences  of  exchangeable 
events whose relative frequencies of success do not converge stochastically in a precise 
sense
11 and iii) according to de Finetti, B. (1931), given a sequence  
( )( ) [ ] ( E X j X
j = 1 2 , ,..., ; ) X n = 0 1 2 , , ,...,   of  exchangeable  events  and  an  event 
( ) E
n+1 :  the 
result of the ( ) n +1
ith trial is successful, it is shown that the probability of occurrence of 
( ) E
n+1 ,  conditioned  by  the  alleged  occurrence  of 
( ) E
j ,  is  defined  by  a  function  of 
variables  X   and  n ,  as 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )

















, ,  such  that 





= .  This leads to the conclusion that the apparent objectivity of probability 
( ) f X n ,  is nothing but a metaphysical illusion.  That, in fact, different observers with 
different allocations of initial probabilities based only on the condition of coherence, by 











1, will converge towards a final evaluation of the probability equal to 
X
n .  That the observer changes his initial probabilities, 
( ) ( ) p E
j  into final probabilities 
by  a  Bayesian  conditioning.    That  is,  although  different  observers  can  start  from  a 
model based on different initial probabilities, from an increase of the evidence, its final 
probabilities will usually tend to converge producing the illusion of the existence of an 
objective probability (which, in terms of subjective interpretation, is only a void-of-
meaning metaphysical concept). 
 
Because  of  the  restrictions  already  mentioned  in  Section  2.5  with  respect  to  the 
propensionalist approximation to the probabilities of individual events by defining 
classes of reference, one can immediately conclude that: i) some probabilities can be 
considered  preferable  to  others  and  ii)  the  degree  of  preference  with  respect  to 
probabilities varies directly with the magnitude of the evidence on which they are based, 
but  this  preference  relation  does  not  imply  the  existence  of  an  objective  singular 
probability. 
 
Let  a  singular  event  E be  that  can  be  classified  as  an  element  of  a  sequence  of 
conditions,  S S S 1 2 3 , , ....   such  thatS S S 1 2 3 É É É....    Suppose  it  is  owned  statistical 
information that allows for good estimates ( p p p 1 2 3 , , ,...) of the objective probability of 
the occurrence of  E with respect to the conditions S S S 1 2 3 , , ,... .  Then, according to the 
                                                
11 See Landro, (2010a).   11 
foregoing considerations, it is shown that probability  p2  is preferable to p1, that  p3  is 
preferable  to  p2   and  so  on.    In  particular,  if  the  conditions  Si   are  replaced  by  the 
reference class of all elements, S , a probability estimate can be obtained associated with 
the most restricted reference class. 
 
A first problem related to the identificatory possibilities of the propensionalist model 
derived  from the application of this principle  obviously occurs when there  is not a 
single reference class of selected maximum restrictions.  But it should be noted that, 
even if that class exists, the adoption of the criterion that consists of assimilating the 
probability on the occurrence of a single event to its relative frequency in the most 
restricted reference class to which the event belongs, could lead to a wrong decision.  It 
could happen that circumstances that did not constitute statistical data in a reference 
class  were  known  but  which,  however,  provided  substantial  grounds  to  correct  the 
assignment of probabilities.  In this case, not considering such qualitative evidence can 
lead to assignments of probabilities with a less satisfactory basis than the one that could 
have been obtained from a complete analysis of the evidence.  The general procedure 
for assigning probabilities to single events should then: i) assign the event to the most 
restricted reference class for which reliable statistical data exist (assuming there is a 
class  with  these  features)  and  calculate  the  relative  frequency  ( r )  of  the  event 
occurrence in that class, and ii) consider any non-statistical information that is relevant 
for the occurrence of the event in such circumstance and, in light of this information, 
correct  the  relative  frequency.    In  case  that  there  is  more  than  one  reference  of 
maximum restriction with relative frequencies r r r 1 2 3 , , ,..., a relative frequency should be 
selected and corrected using non-statistical information.  Conversely, if there were not 
any kind of acceptable reference, the assignment of probability should be based on non-
statistical information. 
 
While this method of assignment of probabilities seems reasonable, it is undeniable that 
it includes many subjective elements and that, therefore, it does not seem suitable as an 
identificatory  model  of  a  single  objective  probability,  particularly  in  those  cases  in 
which there is no statistical information obtained from sufficiently log sequences of 
observations.  In case of having a series of observations without circumstances beyond 
the statistics, the model to identify the (theoretical) probability on the occurrence of an 
event  from the (observable)  relative frequency will be, according to  Popper, K.R.’s 
nomenclature (1934), “impervious to strict falsifation”
12.  A vain attempt at solution to 
this  difficulty  proposed  by  Popper  was  to  appeal  to  the  notion  of  “methodological 
falsifation” according to which, even though the propositions about probabilities are not 
strictly falsifiable, they can be used (and in fact they are in experimental sciences) as 
                                                
12 Let a coin be on which characteristics there is no information and such that it is supposed that the 
probability of  obtaining the result “face”  on a  given throw is equal  to  p .  Then, the  probability  of 
obtaining  m  times the result “face” in a sequence of  n throws independent of such coin will be given 
by













1 .  So, no matter how many  throws are made, how  many times the result 
“face” is obtained, or which is the supposed value of  ( ) p Î0 1 , , the probability  ( ) p m n / will be non-null.   
This implies that the hypothesis “the probability of obtaining the result “face” in a throw is equal to  p ” 
is “immunized” with respect to “strict falsifation” (see Gillies, D.A. (1990))   12 
falsifiable arguments using statistical test
13.  It should be noted that, according to this 
procedure,  any  hypothesis  can  be  methodologically  refuted  even  if,  from  a  strictly 
logical point of view, it is not falsifiable and, therefore, that this criterion of falsification 




4. - Borel’s law of large numbers and Cournot’s principle 
 
With the aim of isolating the problem of identification of any metaphysical assumption 
about the true nature of probability, Borel, E. (1905) (1909a) (1909b) proposed the first 
attempts at linking the theory of set measure with the quantification of the probability (a 
probability conceived as a mathematical entity exclusively defined in formal terms) by 
the formulation of the well-known strong law of large numbers, according to which, 
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1 denoting the random variable representing the number  
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This result and the later works by Faber, G. (1910), Hausdorff, F. (1914), Cantelli, F.P. 
(1916a) (1916b) (1917a), Kolmogorov, A.N. (1929) (1931) (1933a) (1933b) (1933c) 
and  Prohorov,  Y.V.  (1956)  achieved  a  rigorous  formalization  of  the  relationship 
between the measure theory, the geometric interpretation of probability and the concept 
of  independence  in  repeatable  sequences  of  events.    The  falsification  criterion 
associated with this identification model was based on Cournot’s principle, according to 
which it is possible to ensure that a quasi-impossible event will not happen.  That is, a 
criterion of falsification that considers only extreme probabilities (0 or 1)
14 to be related 
with external references in a conceptually significant way. 
 
Despite the insistence of many authors on considering that Borel’s proposal does not 
need to assume the physical existence of probabilities, given he interprets probability as 
a purely theoretical term existing in the ambit of ideas and not directly related to the 
ambit  of  factual  phenomena,  one  can  immediately  conclude  that  his  acceptance  of 
                                                
13 Popper (1934): “…a physicist is usually faced with the dilemma of deciding whether a particular 
probabilistic hypothesis should be accepted as “empirically confirmed” or whether it should be rejected 
as ‘practically falsified’”. 
14 Note that this criterion does not allow distinguishing between two absolutely continuous probabilistic 
models $ $ p p »
*
; in other words, it only allows distinguishing between two models that match with respect 
to those events to which a zero probability is assigned, but not necessarily for other events with non-
extreme assignments.   13 
Cournot’s principle as a link between his interpretation of the notion of probability and 
the ambit of observations is indisputable proof of the propensionalist character of his 
proposal.    Consequently,  to  this  identificatory  criterion,  apparently  abstract  and 
completely independent of any interpretation of probability, based on the postulates of 
the strong law of large numbers, the same considerations made to the propensionalist 
model can be applied, with respect to its falsification. 
 
 
5. - Conclusion 
 
 
The presence of such a thing called hazard that inevitably appears in the vision that all 
observers  have  about  the  behaviour  of  all  phenomena,  generates  a  feeling  of 
uncertainty,  which  quantification  led  to  different  interpretations  of  the  notion  of 
probability. 
 
Some of these interpretations (classical, frequentist, logicist and propensionalist), based 
on a  deterministic conception generated in the epistemological assumption of chance-
ignorance,  obtained  objectivist  definitions  of  probability  associated  with  inferential 
structures defined by rules of interpretation, explicit or implied, which define their role 
of identificatory models of the true value of probability. 
 
However, with regard to these rules of interpretation, it should be noted that: i) the 
classical  model  suffers  from  unavoidable  failures  basically  related  to  its  purely 
deductive nature which prevents the testing of its agreement with the observable results 
of  the  phenomena;  ii)  the  frequentist  model  is  based  on  the  collectives’  properties 
assumed as axioms that are not strictly demonstrable; iii) the logistic model considers 
probabilities as values comparable to logical relationships in an ambit consisting of 
abstract ideas and iv) the propensionalist model, despite Fetzer’s changes to Popper and 
Miller’s  proposal,  cannot  avoid  its  metaphysical  character.    Consequently,  from  the 
principle of non-existence of assumptions about the true nature of probability, it is not 
possible to define strict falsification criteria for these models. 
 
This inability of objectivist models to identify the alleged true value of the probability 
of an event occurrence seems to support the deterministic hypothesis which postulates 
the  “proteiform”
15  character  of  the  probability.    Meanwhile,  the  acceptance  of  the 
subjectivist model that, based on an aleatorism concept generated in the ontological 
assumption of absolute chance, postulates the validity of probability assessments which 
do not coincide with each other, provided they meet the condition of consistency, leads 
to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  truth  about  the  probability,  that  there  is  no  real 
probability but infinite versions of the same probability. 
 
Yet,  both  the  deterministic  and  the  aleatorism  interpretations  constitute,  in  turn, 
stochastic models, so it can be concluded that neither the classical hypothesis which 
postulates the existence of a true value of the probability of occurrence of an event, only 
asymptotically knowable, nor de Finetti’s hypothesis summarized in the postulate that 
“probability does not exist” are strictly verifiable. 
 
                                                
15 Costantini, D.; Geymonat, L. (1982).   14 
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